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1. Introduction 
Gordon Barnes accuses Robert Nozick and Eric Mack of 
neglecting, in two ways, the practical, empirical questions relevant to 
justice in the real world.1 He thinks these omissions show that the 
argument behind the Wilt Chamberlain example—which Nozick 
famously made in his seminal Anarchy, State, and Utopia2—fails. As a 
result, he suggests that libertarians should concede that this argument 
fails. In this article, we show that Barnes’s key arguments hinge on 
misunderstandings of, or failures to notice, key aspects of the 
entitlement theory that undergirds Nozick’s and Mack’s work. Once 
the theory is properly understood, Barnes’s challenges fail to 
undermine the Chamberlain example, in particular, and the entitlement 
theory, in general.  
 
2. The Chamberlain Example  
Nozick offers his Wilt Chamberlain example to establish two 
closely related points. First, it demonstrates the plausibility of what 
Nozick calls a “historical” account of distributive justice (in particular, 
of his own “entitlement theory”). Historical conceptions hold that 
justice and injustice in holdings are matters of what has actually 
happened, of how a person ended up with a particular holding.3 
                                                          
1 Gordon Barnes, “Wilt Chamberlain Redux?” Philosophia vol. 44, no. 1 
(2016), pp. 79-85. 
 
2 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
 
3 Ibid., p. 152.  
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Specifically, if one can trace a holding through just steps to a just 
initial acquisition, or to some such steps that are unjust but rectified, 
the holding in question is just.4  According to historical theorists, the 
fact that two distributions are structurally identical—for example, you 
and I each have $10 in our wallets—is no guarantee that they are 
equally just or unjust holdings.5 
Having offered a partial justification of a historical view of 
justice, Nozick turns to establishing a second point: the implausibility 
of “patterned” or “end result” accounts of distributive justice.6 
Patterned theories hold that a just set of holdings varies directly in 
accordance with some moral principle.7 A theory holding that need 
generates claims will identify a set of holdings that grants the most 
goods to those most in need. End result theories hold that there is some 
specific goal that a set of holdings must achieve.8 For example, a 
theory requiring maximizing equality will identify the set of available 
holdings that best achieves equality of outcome as just. 
Theories of justice in holdings consist of justifying reasons 
(JRs) and distributions (Dx) resulting from the application of the JRs. 
The Wilt Chamberlain example invites the reader to fix her favored 
distribution (call it D1) resulting from the reader’s favored JRs. From 
D1, Nozick suggests that we allow people to engage in a certain 
activity they desire, like watching Wilt Chamberlain, a “great gate 
attraction,” play basketball.9 Chamberlain agrees to play for a 
                                                                                                                              
 
4 Ibid., p. 151. Of course, a proper theory of justice might also include a 
theory of abandonment, statutes of limitations on claims of injustice, and so 
on.  
 
5 Ibid., p. 155.  
 
6 Ibid. It is important to see that the Chamberlain example does not establish a 
just starting point. It establishes only the problem with maintaining some 
putatively just starting point. For a discussion of this issue, see Hillel Steiner, 
“The Natural Right to the Means of Production” The Philosophical Quarterly 
vol. 26, no. 106 (1977), pp. 41-49. 
 
7 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 155-56.  
 
8 Ibid., pp. 153-55. 
 
9 Ibid., p. 161. 
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particular team on the stipulation that each person willingly attending 
the team’s home games drops a quarter in a box especially for him. 
After a full season and one million such transactions, a new 
distribution (D2) results. In D2, Wilt Chamberlain has an “extra” 
$250,000. Nozick asks whether D2 is just.10 
If D2 is just, the argument goes, then the set of JRs does not 
justify a unique distribution. D1 was just, ex hypothesi, and so is D2. 
Nozick presumably thinks that most people will accept this conclusion. 
On this understanding, combining a just initial distribution with 
justice-preserving transactions (respecting the rules of the entitlement 
theory) results in just distributions.11 
One who believes that D2 is unjust, on the other hand, might 
claim that D3, in which Chamberlain turns over a proper subset of his 
earnings in taxes, is instead just. In this case, both D1 and D3 are just. 
There are two possible scenarios, then, resulting from consideration of 
the Chamberlain example. Either Chamberlain is entitled to all of his 
earnings, in which case the JRs justify both D1 and D2, or 
Chamberlain is entitled only to his post-tax earnings (or some other 
distribution), in which case the JRs justify both D1 and D3. Either way, 
the JRs do not justify a unique Dx. Only those suggesting that 
Chamberlain must surrender all of his “excess” income, returning to 
D1, can avoid admitting that no unique just distribution comes from 
any plausible set of JRs. 
The historical theorist focuses not on the resulting distribution 
(since liberty upsets patterns), but on the JRs, which are entirely 
historical, when examining how a distribution arose. So long as the 
Dx—whatever it is—has arisen through just initial acquisitions and 
through just transfers, or is the result of an appropriate rectification of 
injustice, that Dx is just. This exclusive focus on historical JRs is the 
hallmark of a historical account of justice in holdings. 
 
3. Mack’s Challenges to Patterned Theories: The Explanatory 
Argument and the (False) Promise Argument 
Barnes aims to construct and refute two challenges the 
Chamberlain example presses against patterned theories of justice. Eric 
Mack identifies both: 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Nozick compares justice-preserving transfers to valid inferences. The latter 
are truth-preserving while the former are justice-preserving; see ibid., p. 151.  
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Nozick is actually making two distinct, but interconnected 
points against the pattern theorist. First, the friend of pattern is 
bound to explain, but cannot explain, how quite innocuous 
transactions . . . can inject injustice into a previously just 
world. Second, the program of the friend of pattern promises 
us more than the ongoing application of the favored pattern 
can deliver—precisely because the successive application of 
the pattern is incompatible with the entitlements to holdings 
that we expect under the banner of justice in holdings.12  
 
Barnes deems the challenge to explain how injustice infects the post-
transfer set of holdings in D2 “The Explanatory Argument.” He calls 
the patterned theorist’s inability to tell people what they are entitled to 
“The False Promise Argument.” 
             The Explanatory Argument, Barnes claims, forces a dilemma 
on the patterned theorist. He “must say that there is an injustice after 
the Chamberlain transactions since his favorite pattern is violated. But 
if there is an injustice at the end of the story, then there must be some 
explanation of that injustice . . . . Either the pattern theorist explains the 
injustice in terms of some feature of the historical process that 
produced the distribution at the end of the story, or else the pattern 
theorist explains the injustice in terms of some nonhistorical feature of 
that distribution.”13 The former option unfortunately appeals to a 
historical conception of justice, which presumably violates the JRs 
endorsed by patterned theorists.  Barnes claims that the latter 
option amounts to saying that “completely innocuous actions can 
produce injustice, and that is simply implausible.”14 
               Barnes cites Mack to justify this interpretation of The 
Explanatory Argument: 
 
[T]he only thing that the pattern theorist can appeal to [in 
order to explain this injustice] is the sub optimality of the 
                                                          
12 Eric Mack, “Self-Ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism (Part 1): 
Challenges to the Self-Ownership Thesis,” Politics, Philosophy, and 
Economics vol. 12 (2002), pp. 83-84.  
 
13 Barnes, “Wilt Chamberlain Redux?” p. 81. 
 
14 Ibid. 
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resulting D2. If the pattern theorist attempts to respond to 
Nozick by insisting on the non-innocuous character of 
certain processes that have been involved in the emergence 
of D2, he abandons his own view that the justice of any 
distribution is entirely a matter of the degree to which he 
realizes the right sort of pattern and is not at all a matter of 
the process by which it arises.15  
 
Unmoved by The Explanatory Argument, Barnes writes that Mack has 
ignored a salient possibility: “Perhaps the explanation of the injustice 
the pattern theorist will cite lies in the consequences of the 
distribution.”16 Following Thomas Nagel, Barnes notes that “principles 
of justice are intended to govern entire societies, over long periods of 
time.”17 Focusing on the Chamberlain transaction in isolation from 
other transactions that would occur in society, we overlook the 
cumulative negative externalities. 
               Although the results in the Chamberlain case are 
insignificant, a series of similar transactions in other areas across time 
could produce startling inequality.18 The inequality in the Chamberlain 
example massively benefits Chamberlain, but it does not obviously 
significantly harm anyone else. Nonetheless, accumulated effects could 
“lead to extreme inequality, and thereby cause many other harms to 
people in that society.”19 Barnes calls this the Compounded 
Consequences Challenge. 
                Barnes endeavors to block two possible responses from the 
historical theorist. The first response denies “that the consequences of a 
freely chosen distribution are relevant to the justice or injustice of that 
distribution.”20 Barnes rejects this principle as implausible; he notes, or 
at least implies, that Mack does as well.  
                                                          
15 Mack, “Self-Ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism (Part 1),” p. 83. 
 
16 Barnes, “Wilt Chamberlain Redux?” p. 81. 
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Ibid., p. 82. 
 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 Ibid. 
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Barnes attributes to Mack a different, second response, one 
that concedes “that the consequences of a freely chosen distribution are 
relevant to its justice, but (insists) that those consequences will be good 
overall.”21 Mack suggests this response when he asks, “[W]hat reason 
is there to believe that the aggregate of side effects of Chamberlain’s 
wealth (and the other disproportionate shares of wealth accumulated 
through voluntary exchange) would be negative—indeed, negative 
enough to render those side effects a net negative?”22 Barnes seems to 
deem Mack’s response to the Compounded Consequence Challenge 
inconclusive, claiming that “Mack has obscured the dialectical 
situation at this point in the argument.”23 The dispute concerns what 
will happen in actuality; Barnes writes that “this debate ultimately rests 
on an empirical question.”24 While Mack offered one possible 
outcome, he cannot believe he has offered a satisfactory response to 
the Compounded Consequence Challenge.  In lieu of evidence, Mack’s 
response amounts to an assertion, or as Barnes puts it, “Mack offers no 
empirical evidence for that assumption, so it is unjustified.”25 
 
4. The False Promise and the Special Guarantee 
Barnes is also unmoved by historical theorists’ False Promise 
Argument. This argument holds that patterned principles of justice 
promise people what they are entitled to as a matter of justice, but 
cannot deliver on that promise. Mack here presents the problem: 
 
[I]n order to maintain allegiance to his favored pattern, the 
pattern theorist has to say that his doctrine never promises 
people any particular, identifiable, institutionalized income 
regime. Rather, in the name of distributive justice, people are 
promised income regimes that will be changed periodically (in 
light of what income streams have come into existence and 
what new technologies for generating income streams and for 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Mack, “Self-Ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism (Part 1),” p. 94. 
 
23 Barnes, “Wilt Chamberlain Redux?” p. 82. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Ibid., p. 83. 
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redistributing them seem to have been discovered) so as to 
attempt to produce an optimal long-term distribution.26  
 
The patterned theorist thus “puts us in the dark about what our just 
income claims really are.”27 New rules and technologies can always be 
invented to best achieve the favored pattern. These rules and 
technologies can be used to extract holdings from people in new ways. 
As a result, “we will quickly learn the foolishness of describing the 
income that anyone receives under any given regime as his just 
income. For we will quickly learn that social calculations in the not 
very distant future will very likely reclassify at least some of that 
income as unjust.”28 
Indeed, redistribution could be necessary even in the absence 
of transactions. If our neighbors engage in profligate consumption of 
their holdings and we save our money, some of our money—where 
“our” must be used descriptively and not normatively—could actually 
belong to our neighbors if the ideal pattern is violated. The upshot in 
such situations is that patterned theories make it easy to create 
demands for redistributions that better fit the preferred pattern of 
justice.29 Quickly spending money in the hopes of “locking in” a 
benefit will not do; all forms of wealth might be subject to 
redistribution. Thus, on a patterned theory of justice, people can never 
know what is truly theirs. 
In response, and in order to establish that the historical theorist 
is in no better position to offer a promised list of 
holdings, Barnes suggests the No Special Guarantee Challenge.  He 
writes that “the crucial premise” of the False Promise Argument “is 
that people must be able to form legitimate expectations about their 
future holdings.”30 However, Barnes finds this statement ambiguous: 
“[T]he content of people’s expectations about their future holdings can 
be more or less specific, by degrees. Thus, there is an entire spectrum 
                                                          
26 Mack, “Self-Ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism (Part 1),” p. 89. 
 
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 This example is borrowed from ibid., p. 81. A different means by which a 
pattern can be violated in the absence of transactions is in ibid., p. 81 n. 12. 
 
30 Barnes, “Wilt Chamberlain Redux?” p. 84. 
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of possible interpretations of this requirement . . . . At one end of the 
spectrum the requirement is that people be able to determine the exact 
monetary value of their future holdings.”31 Barnes notes that not even 
Mack’s theory satisfies this reading. After all, we do not know what 
will have value on the market.32 On this extreme end of the spectrum of 
“guarantee,” neither the patterned nor the historical theorist can offer a 
guarantee. So, the historical theorist gains no traction against the 
patterned theorist. 
Moving on the spectrum toward a less precise guarantee of 
income, both the patterned theorist and the historical theorist can make 
some guarantees. For instance, people may “know what their future 
holdings will be, under some abstract nonspecific descriptions or other. 
On this interpretation, the requirement is quite plausible, but is also 
easily satisfied by either a libertarian theory or a patterned or in-state 
theory.”33 A libertarian will say that “a person will be entitled to 
whatever people voluntarily choose to give him in a free market in 
exchange for his goods and services.” A patterned theorist “can say 
that a person will be entitled to the method that best approximates her 
shareholdings under the pattern in question.” Assuming that this is the 
more reasonable request, both the historical and the patterned theorist 
can make a “guarantee,” meaning that the historical guarantee has no 
advantage relative to a patterned theorist’s; it is not special. Barnes 
claims that “what Mack needs, for the purposes of this argument, is a 
point on the spectrum of specificity that is both plausible and 
impossible for the pattern theorist to satisfy. But I see no reason to 
think that there is any such point on the spectrum, nor does Mack offer 
any reason to think so.”34  
Barnes’s objections seem to be the following: First, Nozick 
and Mack ignore the consequences that iterated Chamberlain-like 
transactions can have on others. Second, since at least Mack suggests 
that the consequences are relevant to distributive justice, he must 
shoulder the burden of showing that transactions in line with the 
entitlement theory would not produce relevantly bad externalities. 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Ibid., p. 85. 
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Third, Mack fails to tell us how a plausible theory of justice must 
answer the question, “What precisely must people know in order for 
the promise of a proper theory of justice to be satisfied?” In what 
follows, we argue that, pace Barnes, there have as yet been insufficient 
reasons adduced to defeat the Chamberlain example’s central points. 
 
5. Empirical Issues  
We take up Barnes’s objections in order. First, despite 
Barnes’s claim, neither Nozick nor Mack ignores the consequences a 
distribution might have on others. Both authors work within the 
Lockean tradition. John Locke, as is well known, attempts to show 
how private property may justly be generated without prejudicing35 or 
straitening anybody.36 The prohibition on private property’s harming 
others in morally relevant ways is Locke’s famous proviso. 
Appropriations must leave “enough, and as good” available for 
others.37 
Nozick also has a proviso, which “is meant to ensure that the 
situation of others is not worsened.”38 Nozick’s proviso’s content is 
unimportant because Barnes focuses his attack on Mack. What matters, 
beyond the fact that the proviso addresses Barnes’s concern, is that 
Nozick seems to extend the proviso beyond mere appropriations to 
transfers.39 So if any series of appropriations or transfers have the same 
negative effect on someone that a prohibited appropriation would, the 
proviso is violated. It is thus false to claim that Nozick ignores the 
cumulative effects that transfers might have on others. 
In more than two decades of work on the subject, Mack has 
developed what he calls the “Self-Ownership Proviso” (SOP). The 
SOP claims that, morally speaking, we may not employ our holdings in 
a way that nullifies the world-interactive powers of others. These 
world-interactive powers include the individual’s “capacities to affect 
                                                          
35 John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (New York: Macmillan, 
1952), sec. 33. 
 
36 Ibid., sec. 36. 
 
37 Ibid., sec. 27.  
 
38 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 175. 
 
39 Ibid., p. 179. 
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her extra-personal environment in accord with her purposes.”40 As 
Mack sees it, these powers are “essentially relational. The presence of 
an extra-personal environment open to being affected by those powers 
is an essential element of their existence.”41 In order to respect those 
essentially relational powers, Mack explains:  
 
I maintain that recognition of persons’ rights over their world-
interactive powers, and of the essentially relational character of 
these powers, supports an “anti-disablement constraint” 
according to which individuals may not deploy themselves or 
their licit or illicit holdings in ways that severely, albeit 
noninvasively, nullify any other agent’s capacity to bring her 
talents and energies purposively to bear on the world. The SOP 
is a special case of this anti-disablement constraint.42 
 
The SOP is distinct from Nozick’s Lockean proviso. The latter seems a 
restriction on holdings, but, as noted above, there seem to be other 
ways of using one’s property to violate people’s rights. The SOP does 
not limit per se the acquisitions in which individuals may engage, but 
only how individuals may employ their resulting property. Also, 
Nozick’s proviso deals with whether an acquisition allows others to 
improve their situation via acquisition. The SOP does not focus on 
whether others can engage in acquisitions; instead, what matters is that 
others may employ their world-interactive powers. So even if 
individuals cannot make acquisitions, they may come to have 
opportunities sufficient to bring their world-interactive powers to bear 
in some other way. In order to illustrate this possibility, Mack has us 
consider the situation in Hong Kong, where although there is no 
opportunity for initial acquisition, the prospects of bringing one’s 
world-interactive powers to bear have increased dramatically. Thus, 
the uses of holdings do not run afoul of the SOP.43  
                                                          
40 Eric Mack, “The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean 
Proviso,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12, no. 1 (1995), p. 186. 
 
41 Ibid.  
 
42 Ibid., p. 187. 
 
43 We say they do not necessarily do so. We take it that, as a matter of 
historical fact, they did. We are only making a point about the SOP, not the 
specific actions of individuals in Hong Kong.   
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 Mack holds that “the market order constitutes an alternative 
which is hospitable in its own way to people’s efforts to make their 
way in the extrapersonal world.”44 The market is the moral analogue of 
the natural world. He argues that, just as objectionable appropriations 
may not do so, the participants in the market order may not seriously 
nullify people’s world-interactive powers.  
It should now be clear that neither Nozick nor Mack ignores 
the consequences of transfers full stop. Barnes might have a subtler 
point in mind; he may mean that neither Nozick nor Mack tries to 
prove that Chamberlain-like transfers will not run afoul of their 
specified proviso. Two points need to be noted in this regard. First, 
Nozick does cite economic work to justify his belief that the proviso 
will not be violated. He mentions what he calls “familiar social 
considerations favoring private property.”45 These considerations 
include the following: private property increases the total availability 
of goods; it puts goods in the hands of the most productive; it 
encourages experimentation; it allows people to insulate themselves 
from the risky ventures of others; and it encourages saving some 
resources for future markets.46 If these familiar considerations are 
correct, then there are good reasons not to expect a functioning market 
to violate the proviso. 
These considerations in favor of private property should be 
familiar to those well-versed in the liberal arts tradition.47 When 
                                                          
44 Eric Mack, “Self-Ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism (Part 2): 
Challenges to the Self-Ownership Thesis,” Politics, Philosophy, and 
Economics vol. 1, no. 2 (2002), p. 212. It is important to notice that this article 
is a companion to the piece that Barnes critiques. However, Barnes never 
mentions Part 2.  
 
45 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 177. 
 
46 Ibid. 
 
47 Plato’s Hipparchus (individual profits) and Republic Books I-II (non-
interference from the state) discuss two seminal threads in favor of the market; 
see Plato: Complete Works, trans. John Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1997). Aristotle’s Politics, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1998), discusses how communities might pursue “the good life” in part 
through pursuit of property and wealth (see esp. Book 1); Locke, Second 
Treatise, and Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, two vols., ed. Edwin Cannan (London: Methuen, 1904), 
give position of privilege to the market as conducive to individual happiness. 
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making a foray into work in distributive justice, one must consider the 
foundational texts and the received wisdom of those sources. While 
debates remain over what economic system best achieves the outcomes 
Nozick mentions, those debates are irrelevant to the question of 
whether the market will function well enough to avoid running afoul of 
the proviso. The proviso requires the preservation of a sufficient level 
of opportunities to bring one’s powers to bear on the world; it does not 
require that we have the absolute best system for maximizing 
opportunities. 
Beyond these “familiar considerations,” Nozick cites David 
Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom. This work is based largely on 
economic theory, employing some empirical evidence, but it also 
importantly defends markets largely by appealing to what we have 
reason to expect them to accomplish.48 Nozick thus relies on an 
intellectual division of labor in his work. What Barnes demands 
beyond this is not exactly clear. An explanation of why he is unmoved 
by Nozick’s cited evidence would be helpful. 
Furthermore, Mack cites the history of markets to justify his 
belief that markets actually increase opportunities. The problem for 
Barnes is that Mack does not cite this work in the one article Barnes 
cites in his attempted refutation of the Chamberlain example. While 
Barnes might criticize Mack for not putting the sources in the article 
Barnes targets, it is not as if Mack cites no work elsewhere to justify 
his views about the proviso and markets.  
In the article in which he initially presents the SOP, Mack cites 
two books on economic history. The first, Douglas North and Richard 
Thomas’s The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History,49 
is largely an attempt to explain why the claims in favor of private 
property that Nozick deems “familiar” turn out to be true.  The second 
book, Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Birdzell’s How the West Grew Rich, 
                                                                                                                              
John Stuart Mill, at least in his early writings, holds that markets maximize 
overall happiness and improve people’s moral character. 
 
48 Friedman is not a consequentialist, but that does not prevent him from 
offering an economic defense of a free market system in terms of the system’s 
economic outcomes.  
 
49 Douglas North and Richard Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1973). 
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is a historical attempt to link increased freedom to increased 
prosperity.50 
Our goal here is not to settle the empirical question of whether 
iterated Chamberlain-like transactions will run afoul of the proviso. 
Instead, our goal is to show that Barnes ignores the evidence that 
Nozick and Mack adduce to accomplish this goal. Indeed, Barnes 
himself writes that “Mack’s argument ultimately depends on an 
empirical assumption. . . . Unfortunately, Mack offers no empirical 
evidence for that assumption, so it is unjustified.”51 But Barnes is 
wrong.  
While division of labor has many benefits, notably allowing 
articles to be digestible in size, this division also renders it difficult to 
find experts in the moral, political, and historical claims that so 
frequently (and rightly) commingle in writings on distributive justice. 
We stress the tremendous depth and breadth of the scholarship that has 
gone into the Chamberlain example specifically and into the debate 
regarding distributive justice generally. Claims that a particular theorist 
has not considered a particular challenge or has not shouldered a 
particular burden, should not be leveled lightly. For his part, Barnes 
has argued elsewhere that property is not an exclusive route to “human 
progress,” but his analysis seems to admit that property often has the 
effect of “internaliz[ing] responsibility” and “mak[ing] people more 
productive than they otherwise would be.”52 Note that neither Nozick 
nor Mack needs the stronger claim that the market is the only way to 
achieve these things; they simply need the claim that the market is a 
way to achieve these things. Given his own forays into the fields 
contributing to distributive justice, Barnes should thus be aware that 
the work his challenge asks for is available. 
                                                          
50 Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986). We could, of course, add the many economists who think 
that markets do far better than the proviso actually requires. A wonderful quip 
about the history of capitalism comes from Diedre McCloskey: “Once upon a 
time we were all poor, then capitalism flourished, and now as a result we’re 
rich”; Dierdre McCloskey, If You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic 
Expertise (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 1. 
 
51 Barnes, “Wilt Chamberlain Redux?” p. 83. 
 
52 Gordon Barnes, “Property and Progress,” Reason Papers vol. 34, no. 2 
(2012), p. 149. 
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Turning now to Barnes’s call for Mack to be specific about 
what people’s entitlements to the future holdings are, it seems 
that Barnes has missed the point of Mack’s challenge. Why the 
entitlement theorist must meet the challenge Barnes raises is unclear, 
given that the entitlement theorist can obviously promise things that 
the patterned theorist cannot. The entitlement theorist holds that 
whatever arises for me in a just situation via justice-preserving steps is 
itself just. While that formulation is intentionally ambiguous, the 
entitlement theorist can promise that when people have what they are 
entitled to as a matter of justice, those entitlements cannot change 
unless the people themselves change them.53 The proviso allows people 
to retain their property and restricts only how they may use that 
property under rare circumstances (that is, when one is or would be 
“straitened”) in order to preserve justice. The promise of your property 
is a true one, and it is unavailable to the patterned theorists. 
Perhaps this point is obscured by Nozick’s version of the 
Chamberlain example. In that example, people change their holdings 
by interacting with others. We observed above that autarchic 
manipulations of property might require redistribution away from 
others, at least for the patterned theorist. If the initial distribution was 
just, the patterned theorist will need to hold that the upshot is unjust. 
Now surely, those who simply increased their own just holdings must 
wonder how their holdings were actually their own when they now 
owe some of those holdings to others. If they owe some of their 
holdings to others, it is either because they were not allowed to 
manipulate their own holdings or because of the actions of others. 
Entitlement theorists can promise that the distorted thing will not 
happen, but patterned theorists cannot. 
When Barnes focuses on income, he obscures the issue. Even 
if, under some D1, nobody generates any income but people 
unilaterally increase or decrease their holdings so as to generate a 
putatively inferior D2, that D2 is unjust precisely because there will be 
some D3 that better matches D1. This problem of never being able to 
insulate one’s holdings from the demands of social calculation 
generates the False Promise argument. If an individual is entitled to 
something as a matter of justice, the individual expects to be able to do 
certain things with the object, irrespective of what others might do. No 
patterned theorist can promise that the individual may do this. 
                                                          
53 The rules of just transfer will vary depending on where the transfers occur; 
see Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 150 and 320-25.  
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The best sense we can make of Barnes’s error is that he 
mistakes post-tax income with just holdings. A patterned theorist 
cannot promise that an individual’s post-tax income is justly held by 
that individual unless the post-tax income happens to match the 
preferred pattern. Barnes writes as if it were easy to formulate 
expectations in a tax-heavy world, and he is correct only if those taxes 
do not try to preserve specific distributions. If there were confiscatory 
taxes on wealth and income, as preservation of a favored pattern 
requires, then planning would be remarkably difficult. It is precisely 
because wealthy nations do not try to preserve patterns of distribution 
that people are able to plan.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We conclude that Barnes is wrong on three counts. First, 
Nozick and Mack are sensitive to the consequences that Chamberlain-
like transfers might have on others, for the famous proviso determines 
which consequences are objectionable. Second, both of them do 
adduce some empirical evidence to justify their belief that a well-
functioning market would not violate that proviso. Third, Barnes’s 
response to the False Promise Argument is mistaken. The entitlement 
theorist can promise that once an individual holds something as a 
matter of justice, the object belongs to that person, irrespective of what 
others might do. The patterned theorist cannot make this promise. 
Since a good theory of justice must make this promise, patterned 
theories are not good theories of justice. Thus, we conclude that Barnes 
has given proponents of historical entitlement theories no reason to 
concede defeat.  
 
 
 
 
 
